Binary t-frameproof codes (t-FPCs) are used in multimedia fingerprinting schemes where the identification of authorized users taking part in the averaging collusion attack is required. In this paper, a binary strongly t-separable code (t-SSC) is introduced to improve such a scheme based on a binary t-FPC. A binary t-SSC has the same traceability as a binary t-FPC but has more codewords than a binary t-FPC. A composition construction for binary t-SSCs from q-ary t-SSCs is described, which stimulates the research on q-ary t-SSCs with short length. Several infinite series of optimal q-ary 2-SSCs of length 2 are derived from the fact that a q-ary 2-SSC of length 2 is equivalent to a q-ary 2-separable code of length 2. Combinatorial properties of q-ary 2-SSCs of length 3 are investigated, and a construction for q-ary 2-SSCs of length 3 is provided. These 2-SSCs of length 3 have more than 12.5% codewords than 2-FPCs of length 3 could have.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multimedia content protection has become an important security issue in recent years, as illegal redistribution of licensed materials has become increasingly prevalent. Cryptographic techniques were introduced to ensure that only authorized users are able to use them. Unfortunately, cryptographic approaches are limited in that once the content is decrypted, it can potentially be copied and redistributed freely. In order to hinder the unauthorized redistribution of digital data, digital fingerprinting was introduced to trace the authorized users who redistribute their contents for unintended purposes [3] . Fingerprints for multimedia data can be embedded through a variety of watermarking techniques prior to their authorized distribution [7] , [10] .
Fingerprinting can be an effective technique for inhibiting malicious authorized users from distributing their copies of the media. However, if fingerprints are not well designed, fingerprinting systems would become invalid when a group of users form a collusion by cleverly combining their copies to create a pirate copy. Among others, the averaging attack is an attempt to remove the embedded fingerprints by averaging all the fingerprinted signals with an equal weight for each colluder, so that no colluder would take more of a risk than any other colluders. This attack also reduces the power of each contributing fingerprint and makes the colluded signal have better perceptual quality.
Various anti-collusion codes have been introduced to resist collusion attacks. Frameproof codes (FPCs) were first introduced to prevent a coalition from framing a user not in the coalition in [3] , but widely considered as having no traceability for generic digital data (see for example [11] ). However, Cheng and Miao [6] showed that frameproof codes actually have traceability for multimedia contents. This greatly strengthens the importance of frameproof codes in fingerprinting. Unfortunately, in most cases, the number of codewords in a t-FPC is too small to be of practical use. In this paper, we introduce a new notion of a binary strongly t-separable code (t-SSC) which has weaker requirements than a binary t-FPC but has the same traceability as a binary t-FPC. Usually, t-SSCs have much more codewords than t-FPCs could have. This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we first recall some basic concepts of fingerprinting, collusion, and detection. In Section III, we introduce the concept of an SSC, and describe a colluder-tracing algorithm based on a binary SSC. We also show a composition construction for binary SSCs from q-ary SSCs, which makes the study of q-ary SSCs with short length important. In Section IV, we derive several infinite series of optimal q-ary 2-SSCs of length 2 from the fact that a q-ary 2-SSC of length 2 is equivalent to a q-ary 2-separable code (2-SC) of length 2. Combinatorial properties of q-ary 2-SSCs of length 3 are also investigated and a construction for q-ary 2-SSCs of length 3 is also presented in Section IV. Finally, conclusions will be given in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give a brief review on some basic terminologies. The interested reader is referred to [6] , [9] for more detailed information.
In collusion-resistant fingerprinting, we want to design fingerprints which can be used to trace and identify colluders after collusion attacks, together with robust embedding of fingerprints into multimedia host signals. Spread-spectrum additive embedding is one of the widely employed robust embedding techniques. Let x be the host multimedia signal, {u i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} be an orthonormal basis of noise-like signals,
, be a family of watermarks, and {αw j | 1 ≤ j ≤ M }, α ∈ R + , be the scaled watermarks to achieve the imperceptibility as well as to control the energy of the embedded watermark. The watermarked version of the content y j = x + αw j , 1 ≤ j ≤ M , is then assigned to the authorized user U j who has purchased the rights to access x. The fingerprint w j assigned to U j can be represented uniquely by a vector (called codeword)
T ∈ {0, 1} n because of the linear independence of the basis {u i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}.
When t authorized users, say U j1 , U j2 , . . . , U jt , who have the same host content but distinct fingerprints come together, we assume that they have no way of manipulating the individual orthonormal signals, that is, the underlying codeword needs to be taken and proceeded as a single entity, but they can carry on a linear collusion attack to generate a pirate copy from their t fingerprinted contents, so that the venture traced by the pirate copy can be attenuated. In additive embedding, this is done by linearly combining the t fingerprinted contents t ℓ=1 λ j ℓ y j ℓ , where the weights {λ j ℓ ∈ R + | 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ t} satisfy the condition t ℓ=1 λ j ℓ = 1 to maintain the average intensity of the original multimedia signal. In this case, the energy of each of the scaled watermarks αw j ℓ is reduced by a factor of λ 2 j ℓ , therefore, the trace of U j ℓ 's fingerprint becomes weaker and thus U j ℓ is less likely to be caught by the detector. Since normally no colluder is willing to take more of a risk than any other colluder, averaging attack in which λ j ℓ = 1/t, 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ t, is the most fair choice for each colluder to avoid detection, as claimed in [9] , [12] . This attack also makes the pirate copy have better perceptional quality. Based on the discussions above, the observed content y after averaging attack is
In colluder detection phase, we compute the correlation vector T = (T(1), T(2), . . . , T(n)), where
y−x α , u i is the inner product of y−x α and u i . We would like to strategically design an anti-collusion code to accurately identify the contributing fingerprints involved in the averaging attack from this detection statistics T. Note that in code design phase, we only need to consider deterministic anti-collusion codes over a finite set.
III. FRAMEPROOF CODES AND STRONGLY SEPARABLE CODES
In this section, we first recall the traceability of frameproof codes (t-FPCs) for multimedia contents. Then we introduce the notion of a strongly separable code (t-SSC). We show that a binary t-SSC has weaker requirements than a binary t-FPC but has the same traceability as a binary t-FPC. We also present a composition construction for binary t-SSCs from q-ary t-SSCs.
Let n, M and q be positive integers, and Q an alphabet with |Q| = q. A set C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c M } ⊆ Q n is called an (n, M, q) code and each c i is called a codeword. Without loss of generality, we may assume Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. When Q = {0, 1}, we also use the word "binary". Given an (n, M, q) code, its incidence matrix is the n × M matrix on Q in which the columns are the M codewords in C. Often, we make no difference between an (n, M, q) code and its incidence matrix unless otherwise stated.
For any code C ⊆ Q n , we define the set of ith coordinates of C as
The set desc(C ′ ) consists of the n-tuples that could be produced by a coalition holding the codewords in C ′ . Using the notions of descendant codes and sets of ith coordinates of codes, we can define frameproof codes which were first introduced in [3] .
Definition III.1. Let C be an (n, M, q) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer. C is a t-frameproof code, or t-FPC(n, M, q), if for any
Intuitively, an (n, M, q) code is a t-FPC if no coalition of size at most t can frame another user not in the coalition by producing the codeword held by that user in generic digital fingerprinting. Frameproof codes were widely considered as having no traceability for generic digital data (see for example [11] ). However, Cheng and Miao [6] showed that frameproof codes actually have traceability for multimedia contents. The main reason is explained below.
In the multimedia scenario, for any set of colluders holding codewords C 0 ⊆ C and for any index 1 ≤ i ≤ n, their detection statistics T(i) mentioned in Section II possesses the whole information on C 0 (i); namely, we have T(i) = 1 if and only if C 0 (i) = {1}, T(i) = 0 if and only if C 0 (i) = {0}, and 0 < T(i) < 1 if and only if C 0 (i) = {0, 1}. Therefore, we can capture a set R = C 0 (1) × · · · × C 0 (n) ⊆ C(1) × · · · × C(n) in the multimedia scenario from the detection statistics T, instead of an element d ∈ R in the generic digital scenario. The property a frameproof code holds makes it easy to identify C 0 , and thus the set of colluders holding C 0 who have produced R.
Lemma III.2. ([6])
Under the assumption that the number of colluders in the averaging attack is at most t, any t-FPC(n, M, 2) can be used to identify all the colluders with computational complexity O(nM ) by using the algorithm LACCIdenAlg in [6] .
Algorithm 1: LACCIdenAlg(R)
Define J a , J o to be the sets of indices where R(j) = {1}, R(j) = {0}, respectively, and
T to be the vector representing R's coordinates where R(j) = {1} and R(j) = {0}, respectively; Φ = 1;
define e j to be the jth row of C; Φ = Φ · e j ;
output "The set of colluders has size at least t + 1."
The multimedia fingerprinting scheme based on a t-FPC(n, M, 2) can have at most r · 2
authorized users, where r is the unique integer such that r ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1} and r ≡ n (mod t) [2] . In most cases, this number of users is still too small to be of practical use.
We now pay our attention to a new concept of a strongly separable code defined below, which can support a multimedia fingerprinting scheme with more users than a t-FPC does.
Definition III.3. Let C be an (n, M, q) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer. C is a strongly t-separable code, or t-SSC(n, M, q), if for any
From the definition, it is clear that for any C ′ ∈ S(C 0 ) and C ′ = C 0 , we have C 0 ⊆ C ′ and |C ′ | ≥ t + 1. The following theorem shows that a binary t-SSC can be used to identify all the colluders in the averaging attack with computational complexity O(nM ), which is the same as that of a binary t-FPC.
Theorem III.4. Under the assumption that the number of colluders in the averaging attack is at most t, any t-SSC(n, M, 2)
can be used to identify all the colluders with computational complexity O(nM ) by applying Algorithm 2 described below.
Proof: Let C be the t-SSC(n, M, 2), and R be the descendant code derived from the detection statistics T. Then by applying the following tracing algorithm, Algorithm 2, one can identify all the colluders. The computational complexity is clearly O(nM ).
According to Algorithm 2, by deleting all columns {c ∈ C | ∃ 1
is the set of colluders, the codeword c i is assigned to the colluder u i , 1 ≤ i ≤ r, and C 0 = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c r }. It is not difficult to see that C 0 ⊆ C L . According to the
Algorithm 2: SSCTraceAlg(R)
T to be the vector representing R's coordinates where R(j) = {1} and R(j) = {0}, respectively;
We prove this theorem in three steps.
(
For any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we consider the following cases.
We want to show that for any x ∈ C 0 = C ′ ∈S(C0) C ′ , there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ n, such that x(j) = 1 and c(j) = 0 for any c ∈ C L \ {x}, or x(j) = 0 and c(j) = 1 for any c ∈ C L \ {x}. Assume not. Then for any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, x(j) = 1 implies that there exists c 1 ∈ C L \ {x} such that c 1 (j) = 1, and x(j) = 0 implies that there exists c 2 ∈ C L \ {x} such that c 2 (j) = 0.
(3) At last, according to Algorithm 2 and (2), it suffices to show that any user u assigned with a codeword x ∈ C 0 = C ′ ∈S(C0) C ′ is a colluder. Assume that u is not a colluder. Then for any C ′ ∈ S(C 0 ), we have C ′ \ {x} ∈ S(C 0 ), which implies
x / ∈ C ′ ∈S(C0) C ′ , a contradiction. This completes the proof. We now consider the relationship between a t-FPC(n, M, q) and a t-SSC(n, M, q).
Lemma III.5. Any t-FPC(n, M, q) is a t-SSC(n, M, q).
Proof: Let C be a t-FPC(n, M, q). We are going to show that for any
, a contradiction to the definition of a t-FPC. According to the discussions above, we have S(C 0 ) = {C 0 }, which implies C ′ ∈S(C0) C ′ = C 0 . The following example shows that the converse of Lemma III.5 does not always hold.
Example III.6. Consider the following (3, 4, 2) code C:
′ . This is a contradiction to the definition of a 2-FPC.
We would like to make a remark here. From Theorem III.4, Lemmas III.2, III.5, we can know that t-SSC(n, M, 2)s have weaker requirements than t-FPC(n, M, 2)s but have the same traceability as t-FPC(n, M, 2)s.
At the end of this section, we show a composition construction for binary t-SSCs from q-ary t-SSCs, which makes the study of q-ary t-SSCs with short length, say n = 2, 3, important.
Lemma III.7. If there exists a t-SSC(n, M, q), then there exists a t-SSC(nq, M, 2).
Proof: Let C = {c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c M } be a t-SSC(n, M, q) on Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}, and E = {e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e q }, where e i is the ith identity vector of length q. Let f : Q → E be a bijective mapping such that
For any F 0 ⊆ F , |F 0 | ≤ t, we only need to show that for any
This completes the proof.
IV. CONSTRUCTIONS FOR STRONGLY SEPARABLE CODES Let M (t, n, q) denote the maximum number of codewords in a t-SSC(n, M, q). A t-SSC(n, M, q) is optimal if M = M (t, n, q). In this section, the relationship between strongly separable codes and separable codes is considered, and several infinite series of optimal 2-SSCs of length 2 are derived based on this relationship. We also obtain the forbidden configurations of 2-SSC(3, M, q)s. Finally, we present a construction for 2-SSC(3, M, q)s, where M is nearly equal to 
A. Relationship between Strongly Separable Codes and Separable Codes
In this subsection, we first recall the concept of a separable code introduced in [6] and investigated in detail in [5] , [8] , which is a powerful tool to investigate SSCs. Definition IV.1. ( [6] ) Let C be an (n, M, q) code and t ≥ 2 be an integer. C is a t-separable code, or t-SC(n, M, q), if for any
Recall that for any C ′ ∈ S(C 0 ) and C ′ = C 0 , we have C 0 ⊆ C ′ and |C ′ | ≥ t + 1. In other words, for any t-SSC(n, M, q), C, there are no distinct subsets C 1 , C 2 ⊆ C with 1 ≤ |C 1 | ≤ t, 1 ≤ |C 2 | ≤ t, such that desc(C 1 ) = desc(C 2 ). This implies the following lemma.
Lemma IV.2. Any t-SSC(n, M, q) is a t-SC(n, M, q).
The following example shows that the converse of Lemma IV.2 does not always hold. 
This implies that C is not a 2-SSC(3, 5, 2).
However, the following result shows that a 2-SSC(2, M, q) is always a 2-SC(2, M, q).
Theorem IV.4. Let C be a (2, M, q) code. Then C is a 2-SSC(2, M, q) if and only if it is a 2-SC(2, M, q).
Proof: By Lemma IV.2, it suffices to consider the sufficiency. Let C be a 2-SC(2, M, q). Assume that C is not a 2-
So, we may assume, without loss of generality, that C ′ = {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 }, which implies C 0 ⊆ C ′ , a contradiction. This completes the proof. 2-SCs were well studied in [4] , [5] , and several infinite series of optimal 2-SC(2, M, q)s were constructed.
Lemma IV.5. ([4]
, [5] ) Let k ≥ 2 be a prime power. Then there is an optimal 2-SC(2, M, q) for any q ∈ {k 2 − 1,
These optimal SCs are, in fact, optimal SSCs from the equivalence stated in Theorem IV.4.
Corollary IV.6. Let k ≥ 2 be a prime power. Then there is an optimal 2-SSC(2, M, q) for any q ∈ {k 2 − 1,
We note that a 2-FPC(2, M, q) can roughly have at most 2q codewords [2] , but the optimal 2-SSC(2, M, q)s in Corollary IV.6 can have about q 
B. Constructions for 2-SSC(3, M, q)s
From Lemma IV.2, any 2-SSC(3, M, q) is a 2-SC(3, M, q). Therefore, we can start from 2-SC(3, M, q)s to investigate 2-SSC(3, M, q)s. At first, we derive forbidden configurations of a 2-SSC(3, M, q). T and
Lemma IV.7. Let C be a 2-SC(3, M, q). If there exist
So, we may assume, without loss of generality, that C ′ = {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 }. This implies C 0 ⊆ C ′ , a contradiction. This completes the proof. c 2 }, c i = (a i , b i , e i ), i = 1, 2, and a 1 = a 2 , b 1 = b 2 , e 1 = e 2 .
Lemma IV.8. Let C be a 2-SC(3, M, q). If there exist
Proof: According to Lemma IV.7, we can only have
T , where i = 1, 2, a 1 = a 2 , b 1 = b 2 , and e 1 = e 2 . Then desc(C 0 ) = {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 , c 5 , c 6 , c 7 , c 8 }, where 
So desc(C 0 ) C should contain at least one of the words c 4 , c 5 , c 7 , c 8 .
′ , a contradiction. So this case is impossible. This completes the proof.
Theorem IV.9. Let C be a 2-SC(3, M, q). Then C is a 2-SSC(3, M, q) if and only if for any
T } ⊆ C, where a 1 = a 2 , b 1 = b 2 , and e 1 = e 2 , we have that desc(C 0 ) C is not of one of the following four types: {(a 1 , b 1 , e 1 ) T , (a 2 , b 2 , e 2 ) T } ⊆ C, where a 1 = a 2 , b 1 = b 2 , and e 1 = e 2 , such that desc(C 0 ) C is of one of the four types. For convenience, let c 3 = (a 1 , b 1 , e 2 ) T , So, desc(C 0 ) C is not of one of the four types described above. Conversely, suppose that C is a 2-SC(3, M, q), and for any
T } ⊆ C, where a 1 = a 2 , b 1 = b 2 , and e 1 = e 2 , we have that desc(C 0 ) C is not of one of the four types. If C is not a 2-SSC(3, M, q), then there exist
, and e
, such that desc(C 1 ) C is of one of the four types, a contradiction. So C is a 2-SSC(3, M, q) . Now, we pay our attention to the construction of 2-SSCs of length 3 via the discussion above. For any (n, M, q) code C on Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}, Cheng et al. [5] defined the following shortened code A j i for i ∈ Q and 1 ≤ j ≤ n:
A j g2 | ≤ 1 holds for any 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, and any distinct g 1 , g 2 ∈ Q.
Proof: We first show that C is a 2-SC(3, M, q). Assume not. According to Lemma IV.10, we may assume, without loss of generality, that there exist two distinct g 1 , g 2 ∈ Q such that |A 1 g1
T }) C| ≥ 4, a contradiction to the hypothesis. So C is a 2-SC(3, M, q). Next, we prove it is in fact a 2-SSC. Since for any C 0 ⊆ C, |C 0 | ≤ 2, |desc(C 0 ) C| ≤ 3 always holds, we know that desc(C 0 ) C can not be of any of the four types mentioned in Theorem IV.9. So C is a 2-SSC(3, M, q) from Theorem IV.9.
In order to describe our construction for 2-SSCs of length 3, we need s new elements ∞ i / ∈ Z q−s , i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s − 1} ⊆ Z q−s , such that for any g ∈ Z q−s and any i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s − 1},
Based on Lemma IV.11, we can construct a 2-SSC as follows.
Lemma IV.12. Suppose that q is a positive integer, s is a non-negative integer, where 0 ≤ s ≤ q 2 and q − s is odd. Then there exists a 2-SSC(3, q 2 + sq − 2s 2 , q).
Proof: We will prove this lemma in two steps. That is, we at first construct a (3, q 2 + sq − 2s 2 , q) code, and then show that it is in fact a 2-SSC.
Since q − s is odd and 0 ≤ s ≤ q 2 , we can construct a code C on Q = {∞ 0 , ∞ 1 , . . . , ∞ s−1 } Z q−s as follows. Let
Then C is a (3, q 2 + sq − 2s 2 , q) code on Q. According to Lemma IV.11, in order to prove that C is a 2-SSC(3, q 2 +sq−2s 2 , q), it suffices to check that |desc(C 0 ) C| ≤ 3 always holds for any C 0 ⊆ C, |C 0 | ≤ 2. We will check this in two steps.
(1) At first, we prove that for any distinct
A i g2 | = 0 always holds for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 3. We only need to consider the case |A 
T , which implies b 1 = b 2 = b, and i = j, a contradiction.
(1.2) For any distinct i, j ∈ Z q−s , we have A
T . Hence i + b 1 = j + b 2 and i + 2b 1 = j + 2b 2 , which imply b 1 = b 2 and i = j, a contradiction. (2) According to (1), we know that for any distinct g 1 , g 2 ∈ Q and any 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, |A i g1
We are going to show that |desc(C 0 ) C| ≤ 3 always holds for any C 0 ⊆ C, |C 0 | ≤ 2. If |C 0 | = 1, then it is clear that |desc(C 0 ) C| = |C 0 | = 1. Now, we consider the case |C 0 | = 2. T and c 4 = (a 1 , b 2 , e 1 ) T .
A 3 e2 | ≥ 1, which implies that exactly one of e 1 and e 2 is ∞ i for some
T . However, we can prove none of them is possible. ∈ {b 1 , b 2 } from c 2 and c 3 , a contradiction. So, this case is impossible. Similarly, we can know that it is impossible for from c 1 and c 3 ) . Hence, without loss of generality, we may assume that e 1 ∈ Z q−s and there exists 0 ≤ i ≤ s − 1 such that e 2 = ∞ i . Then we can derive that a 1 , a 2 , b 1 = a 1 + i, b 2 = a 2 + i ∈ Z q−s , which imply c 1 , c 6 ∈ D s . So we can derive e 1 = a 1 + 2i = a 2 + 2i, which implies a 1 = a 2 , a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
Similarly, it is impossible that {c from c 3 and c 7 ) . Hence there exists 0 ≤ i, j, k ≤ s − 1 such that exactly one of e 1 and e 2 is ∞ i , and ∞ j ∈ {b 1 , b 2 }, ∞ k ∈ {a 1 , a 2 }. Then at least one of (a 1 , b 1 , e 1 )
T and (a 2 , b 2 , e 2 ) T contains at least two components from {∞ 0 , ∞ 1 , . . . , ∞ s−1 }, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
Similarly, it is impossible that {c ′ , c ′′ } ∈ {{c 3 , c 8 }, {c 4 , c 6 }, {c 4 , c 8 }, {c 5 , c 6 }, {c 5 , c 7 }}.
The conclusion then comes from Lemma IV.11.
Theorem IV.13. There exists a 2-SSC(3, We can summarize the results obtained in (1)- (8) As is well-known, for any 2-FPC(3, M, q), we have M ≤ q 2 (see for example [1] ). Theorem IV.13 shows that there is an infinite series of 2-SSC(3, M ′ , q)s which have more than 12.5% codewords than 2-FPC(3, M, q)s could have. For example, we compare the number of codewords between 2-FPC(3, q 2 , q) and 2-SSC(3, 9 8 q 2 , q), where q ≡ 4 (mod 8) and 4 ≤ q ≤ 100.
